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In this article, we evaluate underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) at the Berlin Stock Ex-
change between 1870 and 1896. In contrast to modern data, first day returns were extraordinary 
low and averaged less than five percent, even during the speculative period of the early 1870s. 
Moreover, standard underpricing theories based on asymmetric information, signalling mecha-
nisms, or litigation risk cannot explain underpricing. In contrast to modern markets, the past 
market return had a negative influence on initial returns. Finally, we show that cash-flow rele-
vant information contained in the corporate charter were readily factored in the first market pri-
ce. Thus, the historical capital market differed from today’s market, but seems to have been effi-
cient.   
JEL-Classification: N 23; N 43; G 18 
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I.   Introduction 
Positive first-day returns of initial public offerings (IPOs) are a stylized fact of modern securities 
markets. They were, for example, reported for the U.S. (Ritter and Welch, 2002), the U.K. (Der-
rien and Kecskes, 2007), Germany (Ljungqvist, 1997), Japan (Isobe et al., 1998), and France 
(Biais et al., 2002). During the last three decades, mean underpricing was substantial, averaging 
about 15 percent in the U.S., Germany, and France. Thus issuers left a large amount of money on 
the table and thereby increased the cost of equity finance for them. Not only the occurrence of 
positive mean initial returns, but also the fluctuations of initial returns over time are noteworthy. 
First-day returns of IPOs averaged, for example, more than 50 percent in the internet bubble of 
the late 1990s, but below ten percent in the early 1990s. Beyond short-run fluctuations, we have 
some evidence of a secular trend in the size of initial returns. In particular, Chambers and Dim-
son (2008), Tinic (1988), and Simon (1989) showed that mean underpricing was less than ten 
percent during the roaring twenties at the London Stock Exchange and New York Stock Ex-
change. Furthermore, Weigt (2005) and Burhop (2006) documented that mean initial returns 
were around five percent at the Berlin Stock Exchange between the 1880s and World War I. In 
addition, even during speculative periods – e.g., during the early 1870s and during the late 1920s 
– mean initial returns were in the single digits. These findings indicate that the underpricing phe-
nomenon changed substantially over time. Thus, the question arises whether underpricing theo-
ries can explain initial returns in different markets and periods. 
Consequently, we confront the historical data with standard underpricing theories. More specifi-
cally, using an unique data set of 180 IPOs undertaken at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 
1870 and 1896, we show that initial returns were zero during the hot market of the early 1870s 
and less than five percent thereafter; this confirms earlier findings by Weigt (2005) and Burhop 
(2006). Yet, our new data set is much more comprehensive. In particular, Weigt’s (2005) data set 
is restricted to IPOs of long-living corporations, i.e., firms surviving from the IPO until 1913. 
Moreover, Weigt (2005) tested Rock’s (1986) classical underpricing theory, but cannot find a 
significant relationship between firm size, firm age and underpricing, i.e., she does not support 
Rock’s theory. Nevertheless, Weigt (2005) is an important contribution, since she conducted the 
first and only test of underpricing theories using historical data on a global scale. Burhop (2006), 
on the other hand, has a randomly collected data set at hand, but did not exploit it to test under-
pricing theories; he focuses on the historical-institutional development of the German IPO mar-
ket.  
The current paper extends the available analyses substantially, confirms Weigts’ (2005) conclu-
sions, and yields five new results. First, we reject Rock’s (1986) theory which states that asym-
metric information among first investors is a reason for underpricing, i.e., information asymme-
tries among well-informed and badly informed investor groups were unimportant. Second, we do 
not find evidence in support of Carter and Manaster’s (1990) hypothesis of a negative correlation 
between quality of the lead underwriter and initial returns. Third, signalling theories based on 
asymmetric information between issuer and first investor (e.g., Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; 
Welch, 1989; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989) are rejected, i.e., we reject the hypothesis of costly 3 
underpricing in exchange for the smoother placement of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). 
Fourth, stricter liability rules for incorporators and underwriters introduced in 1884 did not affect 
underpricing and we therefore cannot support Hughes and Thakor’s (1992) litigation model of 
underpricing. Fifth, we detect a negative relationship between past market returns and underpric-
ing, thereby contradicting studies using modern data (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Lowry and 
Schwert, 2004). Finally, we find evidence that first investors readily accounted for potentially 
cash-flow relevant rules contained in the corporate charter. The risk of a transfer of cash-flow 
rights from the shareholders to the incorporators was punished with a substantial amount of 
money left on the table by the issuer. Therefore, we show that information was readily factored 
into equity prices and give support to the efficient market hypothesis put forward for the histori-
cal German stock market by Weigt (2005) and Baltzer (2006, 2007).    
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section II presents stylized facts 
about the development of the German stock market during the late 19
th and early 20
th century as 
well as details about the legal environment. Section III contains a selective review of underpric-
ing theories and derives the estimation approach. The following Section IV describes the data; 
the econometric analysis is presented in Section V. The final Section VI concludes the paper.  
II.   The German IPO market in the late 19
th century 
During the period of industrialisation, universal banks played a major role in the German econ-
omy: they facilitated its ‘take-off’, they provided loans to the modern industrial firms, and they 
monitored industrial corporations. Close bank-industry relationships ameliorated liquidity con-
straints of industrial firms and thereby made investment easier and supported industrial growth.
1 
Nevertheless, bank loans were only one way to ensure the financing of an industrial enterprise. 
Self-financing of investments using retained profits was significant in Imperial Germany. By far 
the most important source of capital was equity. Share capital accounted for more than half of 
the assets of Germany’s industrial corporations until World War I (Fohlin, 2007: 174).  
Equity finance can be raised by firms via IPOs and thereafter via SEOs. In particular, a thriving 
market for IPOs enables corporations to tap new sources of finance. Moreover, by diversifying 
its sources of finance, a firm becomes independent of one key financier, e.g. a bank. From the 
financier’s point of view, shares are more liquid than loans. Furthermore, holding a diversified 
portfolio of shares is less risky than holding a loan portfolio. Finally, a well-developed stock 
market can be – at least in the long run – a driving force behind economic growth.  
As early as the 1840s, a stock market had emerged in Germany. However, until 1861 incorpora-
tion was heavily restricted by law in nearly all German states, and thus the number of listed cor-
porations was rather small. The enactment of free incorporation during the 1860s in some 
smaller German states culminated in the enactment of free incorporation in the North-German 
                                        
1   The relevance of joint-stock credit banks for Germany’s industrialisation is still debated. An excellent review 
of the literature is provided by Fohlin (2007).   4 
federation, including Prussia, in 1870. Finally, free incorporation became possible in all German 
states after the creation of the German Empire in 1871.
2 
The following period of promotion (Gründerjahre) of the early 1870s was one of the key events 
of the economic history of the German Empire, with more than 400 IPOs within three years. The 
period of promotion was followed by the promotion crisis (Gründerkrise) between 1873 and 
1878. During this period, 225 corporations were de-listed from the stock exchange, nearly exclu-
sively caused by weak performance, and only 19 firms were newly listed on the market (Baltzer, 
2007). Despite this substantial crisis, the 1870s saw a substantial net gain of listed corporations. 
Between 1879 and the enactment of Germany’s first Stock Exchange Act in 1897, another 218 
corporations went public, followed by 500 IPOs until World War I. Thus, 1,178 firms were 
newly listed at the German stock market within four decades, more than the 957 IPOs under-
taken in Germany between 1949 and 2006 (Sapusek, 2000; Deutsche Börse).
3 
The booming IPO market of 1870-73 was caused by a set of factors, e.g., the introduction of free 
incorporation, the optimistic public mood after the formation of the German Empire in 1871, and 
the substantial indemnity paid by France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. It is very 
likely that only the combination of these factors caused the boom of the IPO market during the 
early 1870s (Baltzer, 2007). The promotion crisis, in turn, was related to the weak rights of first 
investors under the 1870 corporate law. As a result, the crisis was the key motivation for the ma-
jor corporate law reform act in 1884 (Engel, 1875; Oechelhaeuser, 1876; Deutscher Reichstag, 
1884; Burhop, 2004; Weigt, 2005; Baltzer, 2007).  
In particular, the 1884 corporate law reform changed the rules of incorporation substantially.
4 
This set of rules was important for first investors, since other regulations were either voluntary – 
like the listing rules of the stock exchanges – or enacted later – like the Stock Exchange Act in 
1897. Before the enactment of free incorporation in 1870, most states – in particular Prussia – 
audited incorporation. Only firms with a verifiable contribution to social welfare received the 
Royal concession necessary to incorporate. Moreover, joint-stock companies were supervised by 
civil servants. In general, only very respectable entrepreneurs incorporated and publicly listed 
companies were of a relatively high standard.
5 Enactment of free incorporation implied that the 
audit of incorporation was handed over from a civil servant to a shareholder body, the supervi-
sory board. However, the first supervisory board of a corporation was appointed by the incorpo-
rators, not by the first investors. Consequently, the incorporators audited the incorporation. This 
feature of the corporate law was changed in 1884. Since then, an audit committee of the chamber 
of commerce checked the incorporation and published a report (Ring, 1909; Wolff, 1915: 37, 
                                        
2   The small city states Hamburg and Bremen never limited incorporation. Baden, Lübeck, Oldenburg, Saxony, 
and Württemberg introduced free incorporation in 1861 (Hopt, 1980).  
3   All IPOs in the current sample are going-public of German firms.  
4   Renaud (1875) and Gareis (1880) are textbook treatments of the corporate law. Lotz (1890), Pfleger and 
Gschwindt (1897), Thiwissen (1900), and Wolff (1915) review the working of the German IPO market dur-
ing the late 19
th and early 20
th century.  
5   Baltzer (2007) showed that the survival probabilities of joint-stock companies incorporated before 1870 was 
significantly larger than the survival probability of corporations founded after 1870.  5 
76). In addition, the complete corporate charter had to be published in the newspaper of the cen-
tral government, the Reichsanzeiger, from 1884 onwards, whereas before only parts of the char-
ter – the law did not prescribe which parts – had to be published, but without specifying the type 
of publication. After 1884, therefore potential investors could inspect the governance rules or the 
rules laid down for the distribution of profits more easily. This was an important piece of infor-
mation, since many charters contained special rights for the incorporators (Gründerrechte), e.g., 
a profit share, membership in the supervisory board for several years, or subscription rights in 
case of an SEO. Most of these incorporators rights transferred cash-flow rights from the share-
holders to the incorporators and are thus important for firm valuation.    
Furthermore, liability of incorporators and underwriters were strengthened after 1884. First of 
all, the reform act constituted the legal person of the incorporator, an important pre-condition for 
any litigation. Moreover, the 1884 law prescribed that underwriters and their comrades 
(Gründergenossen) – e.g., the underwriter – were liable for a fair and truthful incorporation. Be-
fore 1884, the underwriter – for example – was only liable for explicit advice given to a certain 
investor, but not liable for information given in a prospectus or advertisements. After 1884, the 
incorporator as well as the underwriter were liable for such information, if the corporation was 
listed within two years after incorporation (Pfleger and Gschwindt, 1897: 126, 202; Thiwissen, 
1900: 17, 43; Heim, 1910).
6 
Finally, the face value of shares was substantially increased to exclude the lower strata of the 
population from share ownership. Between 1870 and 1884, the minimum face value of a share 
was 300 Mark and only 40 percent of it had to paid-up before the IPO.
7 Thus, the minimum in-
vestment to buy one share was 120 Mark, since offerings below par were interdicted. This com-
pares to an annual per capita income of about 400 Mark during the period. The 1884 corporate 
law increased the minimum face value of a share to 1,000 Mark and an IPO was only possible 
for fully-paid up shares. Thus, the minimum investment increased by factor eight.  
Jointly and severally, the 1884 corporate law reform act improved the information available to 
potential investors, it increased the liability of incorporators and of underwriters and it excluded 
lower strata of the population from a direct investment into shares.
8 It is in question, if the reform 
addressed problems visible in first day returns before 1884 and if the reform achieved its targets. 
In contrast to the regulation of IPOs, the issuing process remained similar over time. A group of 
investors – the promoters or incorporators – joined forces to establish a new joint stock com-
pany. In most cases, the incorporators bought an existing firm and changed its legal form. In 
some cases, however, only a business plan was presented to potential investors, and money was 
                                        
6   The 1897 Stock Exchange Act extended the period of liability to five years after the IPO.  
7   The owner of the share had the obligation to pay the call on demand.  
8  Knowledge about first investors is nearly non-existing since there was no need to publish these data. It seems 
that even the smallest first investors invested a substantial amount of money. For example, Burhop (2004: 91, 
98) shows that 76 (26) investors participated in the IPO of the Internationale Bank (Frankfurter Bankverein) 
and that the smallest investors bought shares with a face value of 30,000 (17,000) Mark. Pohl (1984: 42) 
listed the names of the 76 participants in the IPO of Deutsche Bank.   6 
collected to start this new business. Afterwards, the joint-stock company was incorporated and 
the shares offered to investors via an underwriter.
9 The IPO itself was typically organized in 
three steps. First, the price for the issue and the risk-sharing were negotiated between issuer and 
underwriter. Then the appropriate offering price, the underwriting fee, and the distribution of the 
issue within an underwriting syndicate were negotiated. Third, the shares were actually sold ei-
ther by the introduction to the market or by public subscription (Lotz, 1890: 41; Pfleger and 
Gschwindt, 1897: 108).
10 In case of an introduction to the market, the underwriter applied for the 
admission of shares at the stock market. Afterwards, the underwriter sold the shares by and by at 
the stock market over a longer period. In the case of public subscription, the underwriter ap-
pealed to its customers in newspapers or by notifications to subscribe for the new shares at a 
fixed price within a certain period of time. After the period of subscription was over, the bank 
distributed the new shares to the customers (Thiwissen, 1900: 54; Wolff, 1915: 262). As an ex-
ample, we include the prospectus of the IPO of “Actien-Gesellschaft Weser”, a large shipyard 
from Bremen. The prospectus states that the assets, staff, and technical knowledge of the pri-
vately-owned shipyard C. Waltjen & Co. was acquired by the new joint-stock company and that 
the business should be continued. Moreover, the prospectus lists the names of the supervisory 
and executive board members and announced that one fifth of the share capital was on offer for 
public subscription at par value. This indicates that most shares were allocated in advance to 
blockholders. Potential investors could register their demand during a two day period at seven 
banks in six German cities. At the time of subscription, two percent of the potential investment 
had to be deposited at the underwriter. In case of oversubscription, the underwriters could arbi-
trarily allocate the shares to the investors. Seven days after the end of the subscription period, the 
shares were allocated to the investors.     
III.   Theory and Econometrics 
Theoretical and empirical investigations of the underpricing phenomenon using modern data are 
in abundant supply (Ritter and Welch, 2002, review the literature). However, the most recent 
theories mostly require data, that are not readily observable by the econometrician and often un-
available in an historical setting. For example, the optimal IPO mechanism proposed by Biais et 
al. (2002) requires information about the supply and demand for a certain issue; the model pro-
posed by Green (2007) requires knowledge about the distribution of the issue between institu-
tional and retail investors. Given the limitations of the historical data, we focus on traditional 
theories. Nonetheless, we offer the most comprehensive study of the underpricing phenomenon 
                                        
9   Our knowledge about the structure oft he underwriter market is very limited. At least 161 banks were under-
writers between 1870 and 1896. The three largest underwriters – Preußische Bodencreditactienbank, 
S. Bleichröder, and Disconto-Gesellschaft – had a market share of slightly more than five percent each. The 
market share of the four large D-Banks – Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Disconto-Gesellschaft, and Darm-
städter Bank – was about nine percent. Thus, the IPO market was quite dispersed and the large universal 
banks did not dominate the business.    
10   The ability to reach retail customers was very important. Burhop (2004: 235-237) shows that even Ger-
many’s central government was not able to place government bonds without using the retail distribution net-
work of banks.  7 
using historical data and thereby shed light on the structural (in-)stability of the underpricing 
phenomenon and its causes over time.   
The classical paper by Rock (1986) suggests that asymmetric information about the quality of an 
IPO among different groups of investors can induce underpricing.
11 If the demand from the 
group of informed investors is insufficient to buy the whole issue, uninformed investors will 
have to be attracted. Informed investors only buy high-quality issues, whereas uninformed inves-
tors buy a mix of high- and low-quality issues. Realizing this, uninformed investors have to be 
compensated by offering them all issues at a lower price.  
Since the set of information available to specific investors is unobservable for the econometri-
cian, tests of Rock’s (1986) hypothesis add the assumption of a negative correlation between the 
size of an issue, the age of the newly listed corporation, and underpricing. The economic intui-
tion behind this argument goes as follows: large and old firms produce more information than 
small and young firms. Therefore, more information is available for all investors, the problem of 
asymmetric information among different groups of investors becomes less important, and under-
pricing declines. 
Generally, Rock’s hypothesis is supported using modern U.S. data (Kennedy et al., 2006; 
Michaely and Shaw, 1994). Yet, the evidence for the modern German market is not as clear-cut. 
On the one hand, Ljungqvist (1997) reports a positive and significant correlation between the 
size of an IPO and initial returns. On the other hand, Wasserfallen and Wittleder (1994) cannot 
find a statistically significant relationship. Turning to the available historical evidence, Weigt 
(2005: 154), using data for the Berlin Stock Exchange for the period 1882-1913, did not find a 
significant relationship between the size of the IPO, the age of the firm, and initial returns.  
We employ several proxies for investor’s information: The size of the new issue (i.e., number of 
shares offered times the offering price), the age of the corporation (i.e., number of months be-
tween incorporation as joint-stock company and going public), a dummy variable taking the 
value one if the firm existed as a commercial partnership before becoming a joint-stock com-
pany, and the minimum investment (i.e., the face value of one share times the offering price 
times the fraction of capital paid in). Rock’s model predicts a significantly negative relationship 
between these four variables and underpricing.  
The size of the issue and the age of the corporation are often employed proxies, whereas the two 
other variables need justification. If a firm existed as a commercial partnership before becoming 
a joint-stock company, the number of months since incorporation underestimates firm age. Thus, 
the dummy variable also captures information about firm age. The main concept underlying 
                                        
11   Moral (1914: 47-49) speculates that asymmetric information between investors and underwriters and asym-
metric information between different types of investors was relevant for underpricing. In particular, under-
writers did not exactly know the market demand. Moreover, they wanted to keep their reputation and there-
fore offered shares at a price below the fair value. This was known at the stock market by some investors. 
These speculative investors subscribed the IPO. Then, speculative investors sold to the fundamentalist at the 
fair value in the secondary market. 
  8 
Rock’s model is asymmetric information among different groups of investors. The higher the 
offering price of a share, the more wealth-constrained investors are excluded from the offering. 
Therefore, the remaining investors are more homogenous with respect to their wealth and this 
should reduce underpricing. Moreover, increasing the minimum face value of a share was a ma-
jor component of the corporate law reform and we thereby test if this part of the reform influ-
enced underpricing.  
An important extension of Rock’s (1986) hypothesis was proposed by Carter and Manaster 
(1990). They hypothesised that the quality of the lead underwriter is an important signal for in-
vestors. A high quality of the lead underwriter signals a high quality of the issue, a view shared 
by observes from the early 20
th century (Moral, 1914: 43; Jeidels, 1905: 128, 163). Thus, we ex-
pect a negative correlation between underpricing and the quality of the lead underwriter. Empiri-
cal evidence using U.S. data from the 1980s supported this hypothesis, whereas U.S. data from 
the 1990s did not. Therefore, the relationship between underwriter reputation and initial returns 
varied over time, but an investigation using historical data is still unavailable. We address this 
gap by including a measure of underwriter quality – the share of a bank in the Imperial Loan 
Syndicate (Reichsanleihenkonsortium) – into the regression.
12 
Another theoretical explanation of the underpricing phenomenon is based on asymmetric infor-
mation between issuer and first investor. In particular, if the issuer knows more about the issue 
than the investor, a classic lemons problem emerges and the issuer should underprice the IPO to 
signal its quality. In particular, high-quality IPOs should use costly underpricing as a signal and 
they are more likely to take the money back from the table later on by having larger SEOs (Grin-
blatt and Hwang; Welch, 1989; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). However, most empirical studies 
using modern U.S. and German data reject this signalling model (Kennedy et al., 2006; Michaely 
and Shaw, 1994; Wasserfallen and Wittleder, 1994). Studies based on historical data to test the 
time-stability of the phenomenon are unavailable. Our measure of SEO activity is the size of 
SEOs placed during five years after the IPO divided by the size of the IPO.  
Furthermore, we incorporate the market sentiment hypothesis. Contemporaries hypothesised that 
the general economic and political climate, as well as the liquidity of the financial market, influ-
enced the success of IPOs (Lotz, 1890: 44; Moral, 1914). Empirical studies using modern U.S. 
and German data also support a positive correlation between past performance of the stock mar-
ket and initial returns (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Lowry and Schwert, 2004; Ljungqvist, 1997). 
Moreover, Weigt (2005: 154) reports a positive correlation between the performance of a stock 
market index during the year preceding the IPO and initial returns for her sample of IPOs of 
long-living firms. We measure market performance by the return of the historical DAX-30 calcu-
lated by Ronge (2002) during the year preceding the IPO.  
Moreover, we account for a special feature of the historical capital market, the incorporators’ 
rights (Gründerrechte). They allocated cash-flow rights from the shareholders to the incorpora-
                                        
12   Only the most prestigious joint-stock credit banks and private banking houses were members of the consor-
tium, and the membership was several times adjusted. See Reitmayer (1999). 9 
tors. This can affect underpricing since the extent of the cash-flow rights transfer is not known at 
the time of going public, thereby increasing the uncertainty regarding the fair firm value. For 
example, if incorporators have subscription rights in case of an SEO, the right only has a value if 
a SEO takes place. The value of the right then depends on the share price of the corporation at 
the time of issue, the fraction of shares allocated to the incorporators, and the subscription price 
of the incorporators.
13 Thus, we expect a positive relationship between initial returns and the in-
corporators rights dummy as a compensation for higher uncertainty about the firm value and for 
the expected transfer of shareholder value to the incorporators.   
Finally, we include a dummy variable taking the value one for all issues after the reform of the 
1884 corporate law reform act. This dummy variable accounts for all changes of the post-reform 
period compared to the pre-reform period not covered by the above mentioned variables. For 
example, the 1884 corporate law increased the litigation risk for incorporators and underwriters 
in case of fraudulent IPOs. If litigation is possible, incorporators and underwriters would prefer 
positive initial returns since this indicates that the offering price was fair. However, the dummy 
variable also takes up all unobserved characteristics, whose impact on underpricing differs be-
tween the two sub-periods, e.g., differences in the quality of the firms going public or differences 
in the fraction of shares kept by the incorporators.  
In summary, we estimate the following regression:  
 
i1 i 2 i 3 i i 4 i 5 i 6 i IR c x DAX DAX 1884 Change Rights 1884 = +β +β +β ∆ +β +β +β ∆ +ε 
The dependent variable IRi measures the ‘first-day’ return of IPO i in percentage points. The 
empirical investigation in Section V mainly employs the first return observed during the first five 
days after the official going public. This seems reasonable given the lower speed of information 
processing at historical stock markets. Moreover, we employ true first-day returns in a control 
regression, but did not find any difference in the results. The vector of xi of firm-specific ex-
planatory variables accounts for observable characteristics attached to IPO i. In particular, xi in-
cludes the size, the age, the minimum investment, the quality of the lead underwriter, and the 
size of SEOs. Furthermore, we include the return of the DAX-30 blue chip index during the year 
preceding the IPO as a control variable. This control variable is also interacted with a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the going public occurred after the corporate law reform. 
Moreover, the dummy variables Changei, Rightsi, and ∆1884i take the value of one if the firm 
existed as a private firm before becoming a joint-stock company, if incorporators’ rights were 
announced at the time of the IPO, and if the going public of firm i occurred after the corporate 
law reform. The results are presented in Section V.      
 
                                        
13   A common rule was the allocation of half the new shares at par value to the incorporators.  10 
IV. Data 
A register of all IPOs undertaken by German corporations at German stock exchanges was con-
structed using various contemporary sources. In doing so, we were faced with the same informa-
tion problems as contemporary investors. Our data set is therefore much more comprehensive for 
the period after 1884, since the availability of information improved significantly after the corpo-
rate law reform. Nevertheless, we cover a reasonable number of IPOs for the 1870s and we could 
not reject the hypothesis of randomness using a non-parametric randomisation test.
14  
For the period 1882-1896, the names of all newly listed corporations, their initial share capital, 
the name of the lead underwriter, the offering price, the first market price, and the date of going 
public were taken from Börsenenquetekommission (1892), Christians (1893), and Saling’s 
Börsen-Jahrbuch (various years).
15 For the period 1870-1881, the names of newly listed corpora-
tions and their year of going public were available from van der Borght (1883). Information on 
initial capital, the name of the lead underwriter, the offering price, and the date of going public 
were collected from Saling’s Börsen-Jahrbuch (1875, 1882/ 83), Meyer (1873), and Berliner 
Börsenzeitung. The first market price was taken from Berliner Börsenzeitung. Supplementary 
information on the amount of SEOs undertaken during the first five years after the IPO and the 
face value of a share were collected from Saling’s Börsen-Jahrbuch. Finally, using this source, 
two dummy variables were constructed. The first dummy variable takes the value of one if the 
IPO was the going public of a formerly privately-owned company. The second dummy variable 
indicates if the incorporator had preferential rights anchored in the corporate charter. 
The register of German IPOs sold between 1870 and 1896 contains 647 firms: 489 for the period 
1870-84, and 158 for the period 1884-96. Our final data set consists of 180 firms: 87 for the pe-
riod 1870-84, and 93 for the period 1884-96.
16 First, we removed 123 corporations from the reg-
ister, since nearly no information was available for these IPOs. Most of these firms were never 
quoted in the Berliner Börsenzeitung. Therefore, it is very likely that the IPOs were undertaken 
at a regional stock exchange.
17 Second, we excluded 87 IPOs for which the issuing price is not 
known. In most of these cases, shares were introduced to the market and sold by and by at the 
Berlin Stock Exchange. Third, 252 IPOs were removed from the sample since we could not ob-
serve the first market price within five days after the formal introduction at the Berlin Stock Ex-
change.
18 The remaining sample includes 180 IPOs with a first-day market value of about 735 
                                        
14   The results of the test are available upon request.  
15   Saling’s Börsen-Jahrbuch is a stock market annual, which was published annually from 1880 onwards. More-
over, it was irregularly published during the 1870s. For IPOs undertaken between 1892 and 1896, the first 
market price was in some cases derived from the Berliner Börsenzeitung, the leading financial daily.  
16   This is a small number of observations compared to studies using modern U.S. data, which usually rely on 
several thousand observations. However, our sample has about the same size as the sample used by 
Ljungqvist (1997) to analyse the modern German IPO market. 
17   The name of the corporation often reveals information about the location of the corporation. If a stock ex-
change existed in that location, it is reasonable to assume a listing at the regional stock exchange.  
18   Using IPOs with the first market price observed more than five days after the formal introduction to the mar-
ket could result into less precise statistical results since we cannot adjust for market returns due to the un-
availability of a daily stock market index.  11 
million Mark.
19 The face value of the share capital in our sample equals about 40 percent of the 
face value of the shares of all firms going-public between 1870 and 1896. 











The mean initial return between 1870 and 1896 was – compared to modern data – quite low and 
averaged only 2.5 percent. Initial returns were nearly zero before 1884 and about 4.4 percent 
during 1884-96. Moreover, only 58 percent of all issues had a positive first-day return during the 
pre-1884 era, whereas about 91 percent of the issues displayed positive initial returns during the 
post-reform era.  
Some characteristics of the new issues were similar in both sub-periods: most firms were pri-
vately owned before the IPO – i.e., they only changed their legal form –, the fraction of corpora-
tions undertaking an SEO within five years after the IPO was around one quarter before and after 
1884, and the mean size of an IPO was about four million Mark.
20 Some characteristics, how-
ever, did change. After the reform, almost no corporation granted incorporators’ rights, whereas 
half of the corporations did so before 1884. In addition, the minimum investment necessary to 
buy one share increased from 380 Mark to 1,352 Mark, i.e., from one time to more than three 
times the annual per capita income. Moreover, the period between incorporation and going pub-
lic lengthened substantially from 15.1 to 25.4 months. Finally, the average reputation of the lead 
underwriter increased after 1884, but remained on a very low level: The large and well-known 
joint-stock credit banks as well as the leading private banking house were largely inactive on the 
IPO market. Nonetheless, comparing the point estimates of the variables outlined in Table 1 in 
view of their standard deviations suggest that the changes from the pre- to the post-1884 period 
was modest. Only the changes in the mean minimum investment and the granted of special cash-
flow (incorporators) rights changes substantially.    
 
                                        
19   This compares to a stock market capitalisation of about 3.8 billion Mark in 1880 (van der Borght, 1883).  
20   Moreover, the cumulative abnormal returns were most likely negative on average, before and after 1884. Our 
measure of CAR is the stock price at the end of the second year, plus dividend payments during this period, 
divided by the first market price and less the return of the historical DAX-30 over the same period. This 
shows a CAR of 15 percent for the pre-1884 issues, and a CAR of -11 percent of the post-1884 issues.  12 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  




Mean initial return 
2.49 %        
(9.14 %) 
0.49 %        
(11.92 %) 
4.37 %        
(4.73 %) 
Median initial return  1.92 %  0.63 %  3.25 % 
Share of observations with ini-
tial return > 0 
75.0 %  57.5 %  91.4 % 
IPO Size (in 1,000 Mark) 
4,083         
(4,857) 
4,103         
(5,426) 
4,064         
(4,325) 
Mean minimum investment (in 
Mark) 
883           
(753) 
380           
(748) 
1,352         
(347) 
Share of firms changing legal 
form 
70.6 %        
(45.7 %) 
60.9 %       
(49.1 %) 
79.6 %        
(40.5 %) 
Share of corporations with in-
corporator's rights 
25.6 %        
(43.7 %) 
49.4 %        
(50.3 %) 
3.2 %         
(17.8 %) 
Share of corporations with SEO 
within 5 years after IPO 
23.9 %        
(42.8 %) 
23.0 %        
(42.3 %) 
24.7 %        
(43.4 %) 
Average quality of the lead un-
derwriter 
1.9 %         
(4.6 %) 
1.6 %         
(4.1 %) 
2.3 %         
(4.9 %) 
Time since incorporation (in 
months) 
20.4          
(73.8) 
15.1          
(44.6) 
25.4          
(93.2) 
Number of observations  180 87  93 
Source: see Text. Standard deviation in parentheses.  
 
 
V.   Econometric analysis  
In this section, we test if the theories outlined in Section III explain underpricing on an historical 
stock market and we evaluate whether the 1884 corporate law reform had a measurable impact 
on initial returns. Tables 2 and 3 present our results. We start with two regressions using the 
whole sample and a dummy variable capturing possible shifts between the two sub-periods using 
standard OLS and weighted OLS (Table 2). Moreover, Table 3 presents two stability checks by 
restricting the sample to observations with a first-day return instead of using the first return dur-
ing a five-day window after the official introduction to the market and by using a Tobit-model to 
account for censoring.  
Turning first to Table 2, we note that the variables in the model are jointly significant and the 
model explains about 20 percent of the variance, a magnitude comparable to studies using data 
from the modern German capital market. Moreover, all variables accounting for problems of 
asymmetric information among different groups of investors are insignificant: size, age, mini-
mum investment, and the fact that a firm already existed as a private enterprise before the going 13 
public did not matter for initial returns.
21 Thus, we confirm the result presented by Weigt (2005: 
154): She reported an insignificant relationship between size and age of an IPO, on the one hand, 
and underpricing at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1882 and 1913, on the other. 
Furthermore, we cannot support Carter and Manaster’s (1990) theory of a significant role of un-
derwriter quality on initial returns. The coefficient has the expected sign – high-quality under-
writers signal the high-quality of an IPO and thereby reduce underpricing – but is insignificant. 
Moreover, we cannot support the various signalling theories put forward by Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), Welch (1989), and Allan and Faulhaber (1989). Signalling the high-quality of an IPO by 
the issuer to the investors by offering the new issue at a comparatively low price – resulting in 
high initial returns – and taking the money back from the table by large SEOs later on, seems not 
to work in 19
th century Germany, since the regression coefficient is insignificant. 
From an economic and statistical point of view, we report a substantial influence of the past 
market performance on underpricing: A one percentage point increase of the DAX-30 blue chip 
index during the year preceding the IPO resulted into a decrease of underpricing of about 25 per-
centage points. Thus, the sign of the coefficient is in contrast to findings for modern markets 
(e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Lowry and Schwert, 2004; Ljungqvist, 1997). Yet, during the 
post-1884 period, the coefficient is still significantly negative, but the magnitude of the effect is 
now tiny.  
Finally, and as expected, incorporators rights (i.e., the shift of cash-flow rights from shareholders 
to incorporators) have a significantly positive effect on initial returns. Firms having such a regu-











                                        
21   Including only one of these three variables in the regression did not affect the results.  14 
Table 2: Initial returns, firm characteristics, and the legal reform   
  Dependent variable: Initial return in percentage points 
 OLS  weighted  OLS 
    Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Constant  3.824 0.325 2.358 0.301 
Size (in million Mark)  0.029 0.846 0.243 0.011 
Time since incorporation (in months)  -0.016 0.170 -0.011 0.584 
Minimum investment (in Mark)  0.002 0.121 0.001 0.113 
Change in legal form dummy (equals one if 
firms existed as a private firm before IPO) 
-2.126 0.187 -1.752 0.135 
Underwriter reputation  -3.480  0.773 -19.999 0.091 
SEO in percent of IPO over five years  0.470 0.554 1.401 0.094 
DAX return, year preceding IPO  -25.016 0.017 -16.269 0.001 
DAX return, year preceding IPO*Post-1884 24.994 0.017 16.247 0.001 
Incorporator's rights dummy (equals one if 
charter prescribed incorporator's rights) 
8.107 0.002 2.987 0.049 
Post-1884 dummy (equals one if going pub-
lic was after corporate law reform) 
-0.561 0.811 0.536 0.765 
Number of observations  180 180 
F-Test (p-value)  0.000 0.000 
adjusted R²  0.197 0.253 
Method: OLS using corrected for heteroscedasticity in model 1; LS weighted by size in model 2. 
First price within five days after public offering. 
 
Furthermore, the post-1884 dummy is insignificant. This indicates that the legal reform had no 
additional effects on underpricing or that the effects captured by this variable offset each other: 
the higher litigation risk of underwriters and incorporators should increase underpricing, whereas 
the broader scope and higher quality of information presented to investors should decrease un-
derpricing.    
Some noteworthy results emerge if we compare the standard OLS results with the weighted OLS 
results, using the size of an IPO as weight. Giving more weight to larger issues leads to weakly 
significant coefficients for underwriter reputation and SEO activity and both have the correct 
sign: high-quality underwriters reduced underpricing; larger issues tend to took the money back 
from the table using larger SEOs. Moreover, the coefficient measuring the impact of incorpora-
tors rights is now much smaller, indicating that incorporators rights were more important for 
smaller issues. However, these results depend on a special weighting procedure for the observa-
tions and should be interpreted with a grain of salt.   
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Table 3: Initial returns, firm characteristics, and the legal reform - Stability tests 
  Dependent variable: Initial return in percentage points 
 OLS  Tobit 
    Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Constant  3.918 0.329 5.528 0.021 
Size (in million Mark)  -0.007  0.966  -0.063  0.721 
Time since incorporation (in months)  -0.007 0.669 -0.020 0.256 
Minimum investment (in Mark)  0.002 0.151 0.002 0.117 
Change in legal form dummy (equals 
one if firms existed as a private firm be-
fore  IPO)  -3.018 0.104 -2.391 0.096 
Underwriter reputation  -1.426 0.926 -7.106 0.691 
SEO in percent of IPO over five  years  0.179 0.843 0.488 0.531 
DAX return, year preceding IPO  -23.439  0.025  -26.195  0.000 
DAX return, year preceding IPO*Post-
1884  23.426 0.025 26.167 0.000 
Incorporator's rights dummy (equals one 
if charter prescribed incorporator's 
rights)  8.653 0.001 7.370 0.000 
Post-1884 dummy (equals one if going 
public was after corporate law reform)  0.658  0.784  -1.695  0.418 
Number of observations  151  180 
LM test [df] for Tobit    86.57 [11] 
ANOVA based fit measure    0.041 
F-Test (p-value)  0.000   
adjusted R²  0.203   
Method: Model 1-OLS using corrected for heteroscedasticity, with first price within five days after  
going public. only observations with first price at the first day. Model 2: Tobit regression, using all ob-
servations  
 
Table 3 presents two additional stability tests. The regressions underlying the results presented in 
Table 2 rely on all IPOs with a first market price observed within five days after the official in-
troduction to the stock market. The delay between the official introduction and the first quotation 
might be problematic, for example if trades occurred before the first price appeared in the news-
paper. Therefore, we restrict the sample to the 151 (out of 180) cases with the first market price 
observed on the day of the official introduction to the market. Yet, this does neither affect the 
significance levels nor the magnitudes of the coefficients: Only the past return of the stock mar-
ket index and the provision of incorporators rights in the corporate charter affect underpricing.   
The second stability check employs a Tobit regression framework to account for possibly cen-
sored initial returns. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show that about three quarters 
of all IPOs had a positive initial return. However, the specification test rejects the censoring hy-
pothesis. Moreover, the coefficients as well as the magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to 
the standard OLS estimates.  16 
VI.   Conclusion  
IPOs were the blood of early capital markets. Nonetheless, until the work by Weigt (2005), IPOs 
on the 19
th century German stock market were not subject to quantitative research. This paper 
contributes to this research by investigating the relationship between firm fundamentals, corpo-
rate law, and underpricing of initial public offerings at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1870 
and 1896. In particular, we evaluate potential problems of asymmetric information between issu-
ers and investors as well as among different groups of investors and possible effects of institu-
tions on underpricing.   
It turns out that the pattern of initial returns changed substantially over time. More specifically, 
mean initial returns were zero during the early 1870s, whereas initial returns were positive on 
average from the 1880s onwards. Despite this ‘obvious’ change in underpricing, we fail to find a 
measurable effect of the corporate law reform enacted in 1884 to counter problems of incorpora-
tion and of initial public offerings. Moreover, the standard set of underpricing theories based on 
asymmetric information among investors (Rock, 1986), on asymmetric information between is-
suer and investor (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989, Allan and Faulhaber, 1989), and on 
signalling via high-quality underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 1990) do not explain underpricing 
on historical markets. During the late 19
th century, underpricing was driven by the past perform-
ance of the general stock market and by cash-flow relevant provisions in corporate charters. The 
latter findings indicates that financial markets were efficient during period under investigation, 
since available information was rapidly reflected in market prices. Moreover, the finding that 
underwriter quality was unimportant for underpricing of IPOs sheds some doubt on the thesis 
that large joint-stock credit banks dominated the German financial business during the late 19
th 
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